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Abstract
The Chinese reform process of 1978-2008 has primarily taken place within the 
economic sphere, involving fundamental changes of the centrally planned eco-
nomic system. As a result, a hybrid economic system has evolved based on a 
combination of resource mobilization and allocation by market forces and Party 
and state domination of the commanding heights of the economy. In the political 
sphere, reform has been much more limited. During the 1980s there were several 
periods of substantial political reform, but since the early 1990s reform has large-
ly been synonymous with improvement of the governance system in terms of 
capacity of institutions and competencies of ofﬁcials. Thus administrative reform 
and institutional changes have been placed high on the agenda, emphasizing 
administrative restructuring and downsizing of government organs as well as 
Party reform. Party reform and leadership renewal have created an institutional-
ized political order characterized by incremental change within the framework 
of authoritarian resilience. Currently, major reform discussion in China primarily 
takes place within the Party organization and focuses on perfecting the existing 
political system rather than on introducing Western models and experiences.
Keywords: China, political reform, public management, civil servants, Party renewal, 
institutionalization
Introduction
Since 1978 China has undergone substantial economic reform. As a 
result the country can no longer be categorized as a centrally planned 
economic system. What we see is rather a hybrid system with most 
resources being mobilized and allocated through market forces, but 
with the commanding heights of the economy heavily inﬂuenced by the 
Party-state. Economic reform has also been associated with an 'opening' 
to the outside world in terms of trade and investment and today China 
is deeply integrated into the global economic order, as evidenced by the 
recent economic slowdown in China following the onset of the current 
global ﬁnancial crisis. In the political sphere, reform has been much more 
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limited. There were signs of substantial reform in the 1980s. Thus the 
Gengshen reforms put forward by Liao Gailong in 1980 aimed to intro-
duce a less centralized political system and in 1987-88 Zhao Ziyang and 
his supporters were engaged in working out a set of reform proposals 
under the theme of 'separating party and government'. However, dur-
ing the 1990s, following the Tiananmen debacle, substantial political 
reform was taken off the agenda. Instead, the focus changed towards 
administrative reform. The aim has not been to fundamentally change 
the political system in a more pluralistic or democratic direction, but 
rather to improve the governance system.  This paper will primarily 
address two important aspects of administrative reform: (1) administra-
tive restructuring and downsizing of government organs and (2) Party 
reform. It will be argued that whereas administrative restructuring 
has largely failed, Party reform has created an institutionalized politi-
cal order that seems to be based on widespread legitimacy among the 
Chinese population. In fact, currently the reform discussion primarily 
takes place within the Party organization and focuses on improving and 
perfecting the existing political system, rather than on abolishing it in 
favour of a democratic order of the Western type.
Institutional Reform
Institutional reform in the post-Mao era has been based on the as-
sumption that the Chinese bureaucracy is too big and cumbersome. 
The widely held belief was that there were too many administrative 
organs staffed by an excess number of personnel. At intervals of about 
ﬁve years, that is, in 1982, 1988, 1993, 1998, 2003 and 2008, there were 
attempts to streamline and downsize the bureaucracy to create a leaner 
government structure. Noteworthy is the 1998 round of administrative 
reform, when former Prime Minister Zhu Rongji announced that the 
Chinese bureaucracy would be cut by 50 percent (Brødsgaard 2002). 
As there were around ten million cadres employed in state and Party 
administrative organs at central and local levels, this would mean that 
around ﬁve million people were thought to be redundant. 
Most of these rounds of institutional reform were based on the as-
sumption that downsizing the bureaucracy would increase efﬁciency. 
They were not based on a thorough assessment of which government 
functions and organs were really needed in a qualitative sense and 
whether the Chinese state, compared to other countries, was really 
that overblown. The 1998 round of administrative reform introduced 
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a change of perspective in the sense that it introduced the so-called san 
ding as the basis for change of the bureaucratic system (Brødsgaard 2002: 
361-62). This concept has three dimensions. The ﬁrst is to determine the 
functions needed in the public sector (ding zhineng). The second dimen-
sion of the concept is to ﬁx the number of administrative organs (ding 
jiguan) on the basis of the deﬁned core functions. The third aspect is 
about determining the number of personnel (ding renyuan). This would 
be done on the basis of the functions and administrative organs deemed 
necessary. Administrative organs would be allocated personnel accord-
ing to the functions and tasks they were supposed to take care of. 
The 1998 administrative reform reduced the number of ministe-
rial-level working departments of the State Council from 41 to 29 and 
downsized central-level staff of the State Council from 32,000 to 16,000 
(Brødsgaard 2002). A number of the old branch ministries in the machin-
ery and heavy-industrial sector, which had existed since the Soviet-style 
planning system was introduced in the early 1950s, were organized 
into bureaus under the State Economic and Trade Commission (SETC), 
thereby losing their ministerial-level status. Other ministries were 
merged such as the Ministry of Electrical Industry, the Ministry of Post 
and Communications, and the Ministry of Radio, Film and Television. 
They had their functions and personnel transferred to a new Ministry 
of Information Industry. 
In 2003 a new but less dramatic reform of the administrative system 
was carried out (Holbig 2003; Voita 2008). The reform involved the 
establishment of a new State-Owned Asset Supervisory and Admin-
istration Commission, embracing divisions of the State Economic and 
Trade Commission and of the Ministry of Finance responsible for su-
pervising and managing state-owned assets as well as the Central En-
terprise Work Commission. Moreover, the State Development Planning 
Commission was restructured into a new body: the National Develop-
ment and Reform Commission (NDRC). The responsibilities included 
macroeconomic adjustment and control. A Ministry of Commerce 
was re-established consisting of a merger of the main part of the State 
Economic and Trade Commission and the Ministry of Foreign Trade 
and Co-operation. Finally, a new Food and Drug Administration was 
established and existing ﬁnancial regulatory bodies were reorganized 
into the People's Bank of China, China Banking Regulatory Commission 
and China Insurance Regulatory Commission. As a result there were 28 
ministries and commissions as well as 18 organs directly under the State 
Council (guowuyuan zhishu jigou) and six working organs of the State 
_________________________________________________________________________23
__________ Governing Capacity and Institutional Change in China in the Reform Era
Council (guowuyuan banshi jigou), including the General Ofﬁce of the 
State Council (China Directory 2004; Liu 2003). This was not an excessive 
number of central administrative organs, compared to the past.
However, the Chinese government continued to be concerned about 
the administrative structure at the central level. There were voices argu-
ing for further streamlining of administrative organs as well as person-
nel. In his report to the Seventeenth Party Congress in October 2007, 
Hu Jintao claimed that administrative reform was an important part of 
efforts to deepen China's overall reform and that the government 'must 
lose no time' in working out a master plan for it. This involved stepping 
up efforts to streamline government organs and exploring ways to es-
tablish 'greater departments' with integrated functions (Hu 2007).
By 'greater departments' Hu meant a system of larger ministries or 
superministries (da bumen tizhi) within priority areas. The goal was to 
create a number of strong ministries that would bring together related 
functional areas. The long-term perspective was to establish 'a relatively 
perfect socialist administrative management system with Chinese char-
acteristics' by the year 2020 (Renmin ribao 2008a).
The plan was worked out during early 2008. A draft plan as well as 
a document explaining the goals and principles of the plan were dis-
cussed at the plenary meeting of the Central Committee in February 
2008 (Renmin ribao 2008b). Following approval by the Party leaders, 
the plan was presented to the National People's Congress at its spring 
session in March and formally adopted on March 15 (Hua Jianmin 2008; 
Xinhua she 2008).
According to the plan, ﬁve new superministries would be established 
(Liu 2008; Hua Jianmin 2008; Renmin ribao 2008c). They were the Minis-
try of Industry and Information, the Ministry of Human Resources and 
Social Security, the Ministry of Transport, the Ministry of Housing and 
Urban-Rural Construction and the Ministry of Environmental Protection. 
Other changes included bringing the State Food and Drug Administra-
tion under the governance of the Ministry of Health and reorganizing 
parts of the National Development and Reform Commission.
The Ministry of Industry and Information was assigned the functions 
of managing the industrial branches of the NDRC that the Commission 
had taken over from SETC in 2003 as well as the functions of the Min-
istry of Information Industry that had been established in 1998. Except 
for management of nuclear energy, the functions of the Commission 
of Science, Technology and Industry for National Defence were also 
transferred to the new ministry as were the State Council Information 
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Ofﬁce and the State Bureau of Tobacco Sales. This bureau had formerly 
belonged to NDRC.
The Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security was created 
as a merger of the Ministry of Personnel and the Ministry of Labour 
and Social Security. In the administrative reform of 1988 the Ministry 
of Labour and Personnel had been split into two ministries, i.e., the 
Ministry of Labour and the Ministry of Personnel. In 1998 the social 
security portfolio was added to the Ministry of Labour to reﬂect the in-
creased importance attached to social security work. The new Ministry 
of Human Resources and Social Security established a new bureau for 
managing state civil servants. In the past this had been a function of 
the Ministry of Personnel.
The Ministry of Communications and the State Administration of 
Civil Aviation together with the tasks and functions of the urban public 
transport department of the Ministry of Construction were merged to 
form the new Ministry of Transportation. The intention was to integrate 
highway, waterway and air transportation. However, the powerful 
Ministry of Railways is to keep its independent status in light of 'the 
consideration of the special needs' in managing the railways. 
The Ministry of Construction was renamed the Ministry of Hous-
ing and Urban-Rural Construction. Its functions in regulating public 
transportation in the cities were relocated to the newly formed Ministry 
of Transportation. Finally, the State Environment Protection Agency 
(SEPA) was upgraded to the Ministry of Environmental Protection.
Other adjustments included upgrading the State Energy Ofﬁce to 
the State Energy Bureau, which remained under the jurisdiction of 
the National Development and Reform Commission. The new bureau 
was supposed to integrate the functions of NDRC in relation to energy 
management with the functions of the national leading group on en-
ergy. The State and Drug Administration, which had previously been 
located directly under the State Council, was merged into the Ministry 
of Health.
The reorganization affected 15 government organs and reduced the 
number of ministries and commissions from 28 to 27—three of these 
were commissions (Renmin ribao 2008c; Guowuyuan jigou gaige qing-
kuang yi lanbiao 2008).  This was a less substantial downsizing and 
reorganization than originally anticipated and voices were raised as 
to the effectiveness and sincerity of the structural reform process. Two 
examples illustrate this. First, it had not been possible to merge the 
Ministry of Railways with the new Ministry of Transportation. Powerful 
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interests were against the merger since it would have downgraded the 
importance of the railways in China's transportation system. Second, 
the idea of creating a Ministry of Energy was abandoned. Here again 
administrative reform encountered heavy resistance from entrenched 
interests. The big state-owned enterprises (SOEs) within the energy 
sector were against the establishment of a ministry that would interfere 
with their activities. 
Many of the large SOEs carry ministerial rank and have developed 
into independent ﬁefdoms and no longer see themselves as part of a 
command chain extending from central ministries downward. In this 
sense, some of the ministries within heavy industry, where most of the 
large SOEs are located, have lost their former power. Such a develop-
ment trend, in combination with reduction of ministries and agencies, 
has weakened the government's ruling capacity. In short, administrative 
reform in the form of quantitative downsizing of government organs 
and personnel has largely failed. This is not only because of systemic 
reasons (bureaucrats unwilling to give up their positions), but also 
because the transition from a centrally planned to a market-based so-
ciety creates new tasks and functions the state has to take care of such 
as health care, improved education, etc., and this again calls for more, 
rather than less, personnel. Finally, as a result of enterprise reform and 
restructuring some of the SOEs, especially within energy, have grown 
in importance and have become so big and well connected that they are 
challenging the authority of government. Their CEOs are not appointed 
by government ministries, but by the Organizational Department of 
the Central Committee, reﬂecting the weight they carry in the Chinese 
administrative system (Author's Notes 2005).
Party Reform and Cadre Management 
During the early phase of the democracy movement in 1978-79 it ap-
peared as if Deng Xiaoping was supporting the demands of the young 
activists (Brødsgaard 1981). However, when leaders of the movement 
began to criticize the leading role of the Party and even Deng Xiaoping 
himself, a break was unavoidable. Deng demanded that debate bring-
ing the socialist system into question was to be stopped and that in the 
future political discussions were to uphold the 'Four Principles'. When 
Wei Jingsheng and other activists responded with attacks on Deng Xiao-
ping, they were arrested and the democracy movement was suppressed. 
This did not mean that discussion of political reform was banned, but 
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it meant that it would take place within the framework of the system 
and that the goal would be to perfect and improve the existing political 
system—not to abolish it. It would be part of attempts to reform state, 
Party and leadership systems from within.
Party reform originated in the early 1980s and was originally part of 
Deng Xiaoping's attempt to reform the leadership systems. Already in 
1980 Deng repeatedly stressed that Party and state were too intertwined 
and that reform was needed so that the Party would not take on every-
thing. He deﬁned ﬁve obstacles to political reform: 1) bureaucracy, 2) 
over-concentration of power, 3) patriarchal methods, 4) lifelong tenure 
of leading posts and 5) various kinds of privileges (Brødsgaard 1987). In 
addition, on several occasions Deng stressed the need to create a younger, 
better educated and more professionally competent cadre corps. At a 
seminar held by the national Party school system in October 1980, Liao 
Gailong, a member of the Policy Research Ofﬁce of the Central Com-
mittee, further elaborated on these reform proposals. He suggested that 
the Central Committee no longer should enjoy absolute power and that 
there should be established three central committees that would 'mutu-
ally supervise and impose constraints on each other' (Brødsgaard 1987: 
43). These three bodies should be called the Central Executive Commit-
tee (the former Central Committee), the Central Discipline Inspection 
Committee and the Central Supervisory Committee. The members of 
the last committee would be 'revolutionaries' of the older generation 
who had rich experience and were able to work but were rather weak 
physically. He also proposed to divide the National People's Congress 
into two houses that would represent different territorial and functional 
interests. There should also be an independent judiciary that would have 
the authority to pass a verdict without sending it to a party committee for 
examination and approval. Liao Gailong's Gengshen reform amounted to 
a system characterized by 'checks and balances' between various politi-
cal institutions and organs rather than by the exclusive dominance of a 
strong and centralized party. In 1982 a Central Advisory Committee of 
old revolutionaries was created along the lines of Liao Gailong's sug-
gestion. However, the intention was to create a forum for retired cadres 
rather than an attempt to establish a body that would limit the power of 
the Central Committee. That this Central Advisory Committee eventu-
ally became quite powerful is another matter. 
In 1986, after ﬁve years of concentration on economic issues, politi-
cal reform was again placed at the top of the political agenda. Again 
the initiative was taken by Deng. It was proposed to reduce the power 
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of local governments and local Party committees. Another proposal 
concerned reducing the power of the Enterprise Party Committee to 
strengthen the management role of enterprise directors. 
However, student demonstrations in December 1986 weakened the 
reform-oriented Hu Yaobang, who in January 1987 was forced to step 
down as General Secretary by the intervention of leading members of 
the Central Advisory Committee. The new party leader, Zhao Ziyang, 
was also in favour of political reform and his report to the thirteenth 
Party Congress clearly expressed his conviction that this was the only 
way forward for China. In the report he proposed that the Party no 
longer should overlap or duplicate existing government organizations. 
Therefore, the system of Party groups (dangzu) within government 
units should be abolished (Zhao 1987). A second important initiative 
was a proposal to reform the personnel system for different categories 
of cadres. According to Zhao Ziyang, in the future cadres should be 
divided into two categories, a political-administrative category and a 
professional work category. Only the former category should be man-
aged by the Party. 
Following Zhao's report, several concrete proposals on how to sepa-
rate party and government and to limit central control were formulated. 
One of the more interesting was put forward in 1988 when Hainan Island 
was granted status as a special economic zone and given provincial sta-
tus (Brødsgaard 2009). The reform initiatives in Hainan were subsumed 
under the slogan 'small government, big society'. Work was also initiated 
to establish a civil service system according to which cadre appointment 
would take place according to ﬁxed norms and rules.
The 1989 Tiananmen debacle made it impossible to pursue these 
plans. To the leadership the crisis demonstrated the necessity to 
strengthen the governance system, including party organization and 
cadre management. A push for pluralization and the stimulation of new 
social associations and movements were no longer on the agenda. The 
reform discussion was brought into the Party and became very much 
synonomous with establishing more efﬁcient systems of governance.1 
The Chinese leadership carefully studied the breakdown of the Soviet 
Union and concluded that the key to preventing something similar from 
happening in China was to create a more efﬁcient and clean Party and 
government structure (Shambaugh 2008).
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Cadre Management and Civil Servants
Cadre management is crucial in an authoritarian system of the Chinese 
type (Bo 2004; Brødsgaard 2004; Burns 2004). Most Chinese only expe-
rience the power system when they deal with the representatives of 
the governing elite, namely the cadres. How this encounter plays out 
to a high degree determines the attitude of ordinary Chinese towards 
the regime as such. To gain or regain legitimacy, the post-Tiananmen 
regime focused on a number of measures to upgrade public manage-
ment in China.
First, measures were introduced to create a younger cadre corps 
(Brødsgaard 2004). Lifelong tenure was abolished and retirement criteria 
were introduced for state cadres. Ministerial-level cadres were expected 
to retire at 65 for men and at 60 for women. The Central Organization 
Department issued a 'cadre development programme' that stipulated 
age criteria for leaders and leadership at various levels from the central 
level to the division level.
Second, there was a new focus on the educational background of 
cadres. This was especially stressed during the 1990s and in 1995 regu-
lations were published that stipulated that an educational level higher 
than vocational school generally was required for leading cadres, and 
that leading cadres at the minister or provincial-leader level should 
have a college education or equivalent. Gradually, competitive exami-
nations for government jobs were also introduced, further stressing the 
meritocratic nature of the new cadre corps.
Third, evaluation of performance was introduced. Evaluation became 
part of the procedures for appointment and promotion. Leading mem-
bers of party committees and government departments were also to be 
evaluated in the middle of their term. Increasingly, promotion became 
dependent on the evaluation of work performance.  
Fourth, the nomenklatura system was consolidated. The CEOs of the 
largest companies were again brought under Party control and were 
managed and appointed by the Organizational Department of the Cen-
tral Committee. From 2003, SASAC controlled the appointment of the 
CEOs of the rest of the 'national champions'.
Fifth, a civil service system was introduced in 1993. The concept of a 
modern civil service was conceived in the mid-1980s and became part of 
the reform-oriented policies pursued by Zhao Ziyang. However, due to 
the political fallout from the Tiananmen debacle it only became possible 
to implement a revised version of the original plans in 1993, following 
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Deng's Southern Trip (nanxun) and the Fourteenth Party Congress. 
The Provisional Regulations on Civil Servants contained stipulations 
concerning employment, appraisals, rewards, discipline, appointment 
and removal, training, rotation, retirement, appeals and complaints, 
management and supervision, etc. (Guojia guowuyuan zanxin tiaoli 
1993). The civil service system was further elaborated and developed 
during the 1990s. It regulated the about ten million civil servants in 
China in terms of rank, salary, promotion, rotation, dismissal, etc. In 
early 2005 the provisional regulations were revised and published as 
'The Civil Service Law of the People's Republic of China'. It took effect 
from 1 January 2006 and has added a few adjustments such as a new 
chapter on employment contracts and stafﬁng quotas. The law also 
indicates a greater focus on qualiﬁcations in terms of examinations as 
well as making the recruitment process more transparent. In general the 
new law has more focus on the role of the Party than the previous draft 
regulations (Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo gongwuyuan fa 2005).
Recently there have also been renewed attempts to reform the large 
and diverse sector of public service units (shiye danwei). This important 
part of the public sector employs almost 27 million workers and staff 
and includes hospitals, schools, kindergartens, universities, publish-
ing houses and other institutions in healthcare, sports, social welfare, 
culture and research. The aim is to transform many public service units 
into commercialized operations that rely on their own ability to gener-
ate economic resources. As a consequence, their staff will be clearly 
separated from the civil service and remunerated according to different 
pay scales. The Chinese government believes that by establishing a clear 
distinction between public service units and the civil service system 
(core government) it will be possible to create a more efﬁcient public 
administration (Central Government Research Team 2008).
Younger and Better Educated Cadres
Did the leadership succeed in achieving these goals of creating a younger 
and better educated cadre cohort? Statistics show that from 1980 to 1998 
the number of younger cadres has increased signiﬁcantly (Brødsgaard 
2004). In 1979 only 29 percent of the cadres were below 35 years of age. 
This percentage rose to 49 percent in 1998. The share of cadres between 
36 and 54 years of age has fallen from 65 percent in 1979 to 45 percent 
in 1998. This leaves a share of only 6 percent for cadres at 55 years of 
age and above.
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The educational level of cadres improved dramatically during the 
reform period. While the share of cadres with junior middle school 
education and below was almost 50 percent in 1979, it went down to 7.8 
percent in 1998. Now almost 47 percent of the cadre corps has a univer-
sity degree compared to only 18 percent in 1979 and 7 percent in 1950. 
Among leading cadres, the share of people with a university degree has 
gone up from 16 percent in 1980 to 81 percent ín 1998. Now more than 
95 percent of the Central Committee holds a college degree. 









Junior High and below
Number (%)
1979 18.14   3.25 (17.9)   6.05 (33.4)   8.83 (48.7)
1985 26.53   5.80 (21.9)  12.12 (45.6)   8.63 (32.5)
1988 30.45   8.61 (28.3)  14.43 (47.4)   7.41 (24.3)
1991 34.97 11.62 (33.2)  16.67 (47.7)   6.69 (19.1)
1992 35.89 12.52 (34.9)  17.18 47.9)   6.19 (17.2)
1993 36.99 13.40 (36.2)  17.95 (48.5)   5.65 (15.3)
1994 37.96 14.27 (37.6)  18.48 (48.7)   5.21 (13.7)
1995 38.32 15.20 (39.7)  18.54 (48.4)   4.58 (11.9)
1996 39.32 16.49 (41.9)  18.71 (46.6)   4.12 (10.5)
1997 40.19 17.73 (44.1)  18.42 (46.6)   3.71 (9.3)
1998  40.49 18.75 (46.5)  18.43 (45.5)   3.22 (8.0)
Source: Zhonggong zhongyang zuzhibu 2000: 1350-52.
TABLE 2: Educational Background of Leading Cadres
Year Number
University degree
Number          ( %)
Junior High and below
Number            %
1981 183,927  30,127          ( 16.4) 106,274          (57.8)
1985 259,596 101,361          (39.1)  79,365           (30.6)
1988 317,123 146,154          (46.1)  74,544           (23.5)
1991 361,512 200,852          (55.6)  61,236           (16.9)
1992 376,773 222,029          (58.9)  55,889           (14.8)
1993 398,189 249,354          (62.6)  49,039           (12.3)
1994 404,119 270,996          (66.7)  39,422             (9.7)        
1995 445,286 315,165          (70.8)  34,466             (7.9)
1996 468,274 346,994          (74.1)  30,532             (6.5)
1997 492,328  381,561          (77.5)  25,705             (5.2)
1998 508,025 409,090          (80.5)  21,202             (4.2)
Source: Zhonggong zhongyang zuzhibu 2000: 1344-47.
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Institutionalization
These changes seem to indicate an institutionalization of the political 
process in China (Bo 2004; Huang 2008; Miller 2008). This impression 
was considerably strengthened in 2002-03 when China underwent a 
peaceful, orderly, deliberate and rule-bound transition from the third 
to fourth generation of leaders. Again, in November 2007, two lead-
ing members of the ﬁfth generation were brought into the politbureau 
standing committee without the heavy leadership struggle of the past. 
Thus it appears that, when selecting and promoting new leaders, formal 
rules and compliant procedures have prevailed over factional policies 
based on informal personal relations. This trend of institutionalization 
combines with the current strengthening of inner party democracy. A 
tenure system for party delegates, a bigger say for party committees 
vis-à-vis the standing committees, as well as new voting procedures 
are now being suggested. 
In this context it is a setback that the Chinese leadership has given up 
on its attempts to separate Party and government work. The slogan of 
'separating party from government' ﬁgured prominently during Jiang 
Zemin's era but is no longer present in the public discourse. There 
are numerous references to the need to separate government and en-
terprises (zhengqi fenkai), government and affairs (zhengshi fenkai) and 
government and funds (zhengzi fenkai), but there is silence concern-
ing the slogan of separating government from Party work and affairs 
(zhengdang fenkai).
Instead there is much talk of merging Party and government depart-
ments whose functions are similar and creating a system of overlapping 
of post and leading members of the Party and government (dangzheng 
lingdao chengyuan jiaocha zhiwu). Thus, in many counties the party sec-
retary has taken over the position as head of the county in addition to 
chairman of the local People's Congress. The vice-party secretary is often 
put in charge of the functional departments of the local government.
Allegedly, the aim is to save on the budget by having fewer admin-
istrative heads in charge. In addition, this measure is viewed as a way 
of improving and streamlining administrative performance by con-
centrating local executive and legal powers in fewer hands. However, 
this thinking is a reﬂection of a quantitative approach and therefore 
runs counter to more qualitative attempts to create a more efﬁcient 
government. In short, it goes against the call of the Beijing Consensus 
for transparency and a system of checks and balances.
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Concluding Remarks: Headed Towards Democracy?
Developments in China over the last 30 years challenge the so-called 
transition paradigm. This paradigm posits that once a country moves 
away from dictatorial rule there is a linear process towards democracy 
and pluralism (Brødsgaard and Zheng 2004). The transition paradigm 
also assumes that authoritarian regimes are fragile due to weak legiti-
macy, too much focus on political oppression, over-centralization of 
the political decision-making process and the dominance of personal 
power (patrimonialism) over institutional norms.
On the surface, China ﬁts the transition paradigm. There have been 
cracks in the system over the thirty-year reform period and it is not 
difﬁcult to discern between hardliners and softliners in the political 
discourse as it has unfolded among intellectuals, the state media and 
occasionally even among the top leaders. Importantly, direct elections 
for village heads have been instituted in the countryside. Also, there 
has been a process where the economy and social and cultural norms 
increasingly have been modernized/Westernized and traditional norms 
and values have been on the defensive.
Undoubtedly China cannot be categorized as a totalitarian or dictato-
rial system. However, the reform process has not been linear, rather it 
has formed a zigzag pattern of two steps forward and one step back. 
The Chinese political regime should not be treated as an incomplete or 
transitional form of democracy. It is a hybrid regime, and as compara-
tive political studies show, such a regime can stay hybrid for a long time 
and prove rather immune to political change (Wheatley and Zurcher 
2008). Clearly the Party still dominates the state and its main assets and 
even controls the commanding heights of the economy through the 
nomenklatura system. In fact, the country seems to have entered a gray 
zone of 'dominant-power politics' where it is neither clearly dictatorial 
nor clearly heading towards democracy (Carothers 2002). So instead of 
regime breakdown, we see regime resilience—authoritarian resilience 
to use a concept borrowed from Andrew Nathan (2003).
It is a regime overwhelmingly focused on stability. The core elite has 
succeeded in turning stability and harmony into the dominant ideologi-
cal discourse and in the process it has acquired new legitimacy. The 
current global ﬁnancial crisis threatens the economic foundation of this 
stability and may create a new discourse of instability and danger. How 
the Party-state will cope with such challenges remains to be seen.
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NOTES
1 In a recent book, Huang Yasheng (2008) argues that in the economic realm, the 1980s 
were also characterized by a more dynamic and entrepreneurial reform process than 
during the 1990s. During the 1990s a recentralization of the economic system and its 
ﬁscal instruments took place, creating an environment less conducive to reform. For 
an opposite view, describing a process of a continued unfolding of reform during 
the 1990s, see Naughton (2007).
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